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I
INTRODUCTION
Several months ago, there was a heated discussion on CrimProf, the listserv
for criminal law professors, about the disproportionate representation of
minorities in the criminal justice system.1  Few participants in this online discus-
sion contested the reality that racial and ethnic minorities, especially African
Americans, make up a far larger percentage of those arrested and incarcerated
than should be expected from their percentage of the country’s total popula-
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* Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law.
  The author thanks his wife, Patricia V. Sun, Esq., and Professor Robert Mosteller for their com-
ments on earlier drafts of this article, as well as his research assistants, Leander Altifois, Monya Bunch,
and Stephanie Stevens.  A note on style—because the purpose of this essay is largely to summarize the
articles in this Symposium and the common themes across the pieces, I have kept footnotes to a mini-
mum.  Those readers interested in more detailed support for the propositions discussed here are
encouraged to consult the primary articles themselves.
1. Postings to CrimProf@chicagokent.kentlaw.edu.  I am reporting the content of that discussion
entirely from my memory.  I am also summarizing comments made both by the discussants and by off-
line colleagues with whom I debated many of the ideas exchanged online.  For the sake of brevity and
clarity, however, I make no effort to identify the precise persons or their manner of contribution
(online or off-line), bundling all thinkers’ comments into those of the “discussants” or “participants.”
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tion.2  What made the discussion heated was the debate over the causes of this
disparity.  More African Americans, argued some discussants, commit crime
than do their white counterparts.  Therefore, said these discussants, the repre-
sentation of blacks in the criminal justice system was not “disproportionate” to
their representation among the population of criminal wrongdoers.3  Perhaps
there are societal injustices that contribute to causing a relatively high percent-
age of racial minorities to commit crimes, but crimes they are, and the fair
application of neutral legal principles requires punishing all who flout the law,
regardless of their race.4  Indeed, argued these commentators, racial minorities
are disproportionately victimized by crime, crime that is usually intra-racial.5
Accordingly, not punishing black criminals, for example, means leaving the law-
2. As Michael Tonry has said: “The prison populations nearly tripled during the 1980s, and by
1990 a quarter of young black males were in jail or prison, on probation or parole.  The chance that a
black male was in jail or prison was seven times that of a white male.”  MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN
NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA vii (1995).
3. See generally HEATHER MAC DONALD, ARE COPS RACIST?  HOW THE WAR AGAINST THE
POLICE HARMS BLACK AMERICANS (2003) (arguing that racial profiling is simply a desirable effort by
police to maximize search “hit rates” by “going where the crime is”).  Analogously, Professor Randall
Kennedy cautions:
People seeking solutions to American’s massive racial problems must resolutely eschew the
temptation to prettify ugly realities.  Crime and its demographics are part of those realities.  It
does no good to pretend that blacks and whites are similarly situated with respect to either
rates of perpetration or rates of victimization.  They are not.  A dramatic crime gap separates
them.  In relation to their percentage of the population, blacks on average both commit more
crimes and are more often victimized by criminality.  The familiar dismal statistics and the
countless tragedies behind them are not figments of some Negrophobe’s imagination. The
country would be better off if that were so.  Instead, the statistics confirm what most careful
criminologists (regardless of ideological perspective) conclude: In fact (and not only in media
portrayal or as a function of police bias) blacks, particularly young black men, commit a per-
centage of the nation’s street crime that is strikingly disproportionate to their percentage in
the nation’s population.
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 145 (1997).  Unlike Heather MacDonald, how-
ever, Professor Kennedy would prohibit (absent the grossest of emergencies) the police from using race
as but one factor among many others in making search and seizure decisions.  See id. at 149–163.
“Taking race into account in a small, marginal, even infinitesimal amount,” Professor Kennedy main-
tains, “still constitutes racial discrimination.”  Id. at 149.  Indeed, he argues:
Race-dependent policing erodes the difficult-to-maintain habit of individualizing persons and
strengthens the reflex of lumping people together according to gross racial categories. This
reflex had many disastrous consequences.  One is the extra burden it puts upon blacks who
want very much to assert responsibility for themselves but confront social impediments that
mock their efforts.
Id. at 157.
4. Cf. Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Population Revisited, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 743, 759 (1993) (“[T]he U.S. displays distressingly high rates of [black incarceration]
. . . .  [T]his is not so much due to racial discrimination, but to other factors outside the criminal justice
system.”).
5. See KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 145; JOHNNETTA BETSCH COLE & BEVERLY GUY-SHEFTALL,
GENDER TALK: THE STRUGGLE FOR WOMEN’S EQUALITY IN AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES
140–41 (2003) (“Homicide is the leading cause of death among Black males between the ages of fifteen
and twenty-four . . . .  Most of them will be killed by other Black males . . . .”).
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abiding vast majority of African Americans inadequately protected from being
preyed upon by criminal predators.6
To the contrary, argued others on the listserv, much of the disparity is due to
racial bias in law enforcement.7  Some of that bias may stem from race hatred,
but more stems from subconscious racial stereotyping or systemic forces, such
as its being easier for the police to catch poor black kids smoking crack on a
street corner than to grab rich white kids snorting powder cocaine in the bed-
room of a large suburban home.8  Still others argued that crime itself is “socially
constructed.”9  Thus the War on Drugs condemned many small-time drug abus-
ers to long-term prison sentences.  That mass imprisonment in turn decimated
certain neighborhoods, denuding them of so many young black men as to leave
these localities partly abandoned, contributing further to a cycle of crime.10  All
this, these thinkers argued, foreseeably had a disparate impact on minority
communities.  Therefore, much of the decimation of those communities could
have been avoided by a careful, consciously chosen alternative social policy.11
Drug possession should have been defined as an illness to be treated rather than
a crime to be punished.12  Because ill-devised social policies and biased law
enforcement account for at least part of the high percentage of minorities
ensnared in the justice system, that percentage is indeed “disproportionate” to
what should obtain in a just world.
Listserv debates often tend to be more off-the-cuff and sometimes more
extreme than more considered arguments in scholarly publications, and some of
the participants in this particular discussion arguably may have used the word
“disproportionately” imprecisely.  Nevertheless, the CrimProf discussion still
captured the contours of a lively and important dispute about the criminal jus-
tice system.  It is not a dispute, however, that this Symposium seeks to resolve.
6. Cf. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox of Unwanted
Rights, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 3 (Joshua Cohen &
Joel Rogers eds., 1999) (arguing that rampant crime in some minority communities requires a new con-
ception of constitutional criminal procedural rights that permits some more aggressive forms of policing
in inner-city neighborhoods).
7. See generally KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE
FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS 26–46,
110–29 (1998) (making the case that biased antiblack law enforcement combines with the under-recog-
nition of white criminality to both cause and exaggerate much of the racial disparity in apparent crimi-
nality rates).
8. See TONRY, supra note 2, at 105–07.
9. See generally RAY SURETTE, MEDIA, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES AND
REALITIES (1998) (presenting a comprehensive survey of the role of the media in the social construc-
tion of crime).
10. See generally RICHARD LAWRENCE MILLER, DRUG WARRIORS AND THEIR PREY: FROM
POLICE POWER TO POLICE STATE (1996) (presenting an overview of the principles, history, and con-
sequences of the War on Drugs).
11. See TONRY, supra note 2, at 81–124, 201–07.
12. The most persuasive brief that the author has read for de-criminalizing illicit drug use is Doug-
las Husak’s careful melding of empirical data with political philosophy on the subject.  See DOUGLAS
HUSAK, LEGALIZE THIS!: THE CASE FOR DECRIMINALIZING DRUGS (2002).
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Instead of grappling with the big question of causes, the authors in this
Symposium see more to be gained in smaller questions.  The perspective is local
rather than global.  All the authors share a belief that, whatever the causes of
high minority representation in the justice system, we should not knowingly
adopt new policies that worsen the problem.  Like doctors taking the Hippo-
cratic Oath, we should, at least, do no harm.13  Of course, we should make the
patient better if we can.  Harm is conceived of as raising the representation of
racial minorities in the criminal justice system when alternative policies could
equally well serve public safety without adding to racial disparities.14  The
authors’ analyses, therefore, are local partly in the sense that they analyze par-
ticular social policies to gauge their costs and benefits rather than assuming a
single overall cause or narrow set of causes for the current state of the system.
But some authors’ analyses are local in another way: exploring circumstances in
a single city, state, or region and comparing them to circumstance in other cities,
states, and regions.  What works and what does not, what is needed and what is
not might, at least in theory, not be the same in Provo, Utah as in Washington,
DC.15
Determining the scope of disparities and what might worsen or lessen them,
of course, requires examining and analyzing data.  There is a growing body of
empirical research on the local and global causes of racial disparities in the
criminal justice system.16  Much of this research is in its early stages, but enough
of it has been done to suggest potential solutions, as well as the appropriate
directions for further investigation.  These data are statistical, historical, and
anecdotal, both quantitative and qualitative, and their implications are only
now starting to be clear.
Many of the authors in this Symposium, however, are not so much inter-
ested in what lessons can be drawn from particular data as in what can be
learned about the politics of data collection, dissemination, and ensuing action.
How data are collected, for whom, and how they are used have political conse-
quences.17  Some mechanisms can mobilize enthusiastic change agents; others
13. The approach is thus in part reminiscent of Cass Sunstein’s praise of the current United States
Supreme Court’s “minimalism,” its gradual, case-by-case evolution of the law, an effort to solve little
problems cumulatively rather than grasping for the grand solutions that may be forever beyond our
reach.  See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
14. See generally TONRY, supra note 2 (making this case concerning the War on Drugs).  See also
HUSAK, supra note 12 (drawing a similar conclusion but from the political philosopher’s rather than the
social scientist’s perspective).
15. Cf. RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 33–
62 (1998) (opining that local knowledge is often superior to other kinds of knowledge).
16. See Sharon L. Davies, Study Habits: Probing Modern Attempts to Assess Minority Offender
Disproportionality, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17 (Summer 2003) (summarizing much of the leading
research).
17. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power
to Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (Summer 2003) [hereinafter Taslitz, Racial
Auditors].
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can breed resignation and despair.  Some data procedures can build cross-racial
coalitions, creativity, and unity, while other procedures incite racial divisions,
fossilized thinking, and social fragmentation. A data-gathering procedure that
involves the affected communities as well as the police, that is transparent to all
concerned, and that is as attentive to the need to efficiently prosecute crime as
it is to the need to reduce racial disparities is likely to foster greater community
support and staying power than a procedure that does none of these things.  But
the politics of data gathering and use is itself local, dependent upon the social
context of particular places and problems.  There is, therefore, a political geog-
raphy of race data in the criminal justice system.
II
THE LOCAL GEOGRAPHY OF RACE
Sharon Davies, in Study Habits: Probing Modern Attempts to Assess Minor-
ity Offender Disproportionality, examines the literal, physical geography of
racial disparity.  Specifically, Davies explores the efforts of three states—
Oregon, Washington, and Utah—who “have recently taken empirical steps to
assess the extent to which minorities are over-represented in their respective
criminal justice systems and to seek out the root causes of any over-
representation observed.”18  These studies were apparently meant to prompt
action to reduce disparities in each of these localities.  The admirable quality of
their admirable efforts has national implications in crafting a model for other
jurisdictions to follow.
Although Davies gives differing grades to each state’s effort, she finds seri-
ous flaws in the chosen methodologies.  The designers of these studies ignored
guidelines crafted by scholars researching related questions over several dec-
ades.  For example, much of the research ignored the ways in which biases at
one decision point (such as whether to grant bail) can have an impact on later
decision points (such as the ability to adequately aid counsel’s investigation).
The research also failed to use appropriate statistical techniques, such as multi-
variate assessment, and to complement quantative data with qualitative assess-
ments.  Yet qualitative assessments are needed to understand why certain
trends are observed.  Professor Davies’ first major point, therefore, is that far
more accurate and useful methodologies can be devised for future studies, and
she offers fairly specific guidelines for doing so.
More fundamentally, however, Professor Davies doubts whether these state
investigations are even asking the right questions.  She charges the researchers
with wrongly accepting dichotomous thinking—either greater minority crimi-
nality or biased state action accounts for racial disparities, but not both.  Relat-
edly, she sees them as engaging in “mono-causal thinking”—only one explana-
tion can account for the disparities rather than a host of factors interacting to
18. See Davies, supra note 16, at 18.
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bring about the final result.19  Finally, she sees the investigators as defining
“bias,” “discrimination,” “racism,” and related terms in a misleadingly narrow
fashion.  Justice, Davies suggests, requires that future studies ask the right ques-
tions and use the right methods.  Poorly-designed investigations into the wrong
questions divert attention and resources from the right ones and undermine
efforts at sound reform.
Frederick M. Lawrence shifts the Symposium’s focus from the geographi-
cally local to the subject-matter local.  In his essay, Enforcing Bias-Crimes Laws
Without Bias: Evaluating the Disproportionate-Enforcement Critique, Professor
Lawrence grapples with the political left wing’s critique of hate crimes legisla-
tion.  For some on the left, much of the pre-hate-crimes justice system was dis-
criminatorily enforced against racial minorities.20  There is no reason to believe
that hate crimes laws should be any different, they maintain.  Indeed, whites are
likely instinctively to attribute racial hatred as the motive for a black-on-white
crime.  Whatever their benefits, therefore, hate crimes laws impose costs by
likely worsening already extreme racial disparities that are not worth a candle.
The theory justifying hate crimes legislation is fine.  The problem is that, in
practice, it is yet one more way to swell the population of young African-
American males frittering away otherwise useful lives in jails or prisons.21
Lawrence rejects the left-wing critique.  Although the empirical studies are
sparse, Lawrence sees them as offering no evidence of anti-minority enforce-
ment as a significant problem.22  To find such a problem, a baseline showing the
numbers of bias crimes committed by various ethnic groups is required.  Law-
rence cautions that the data are too incomplete to draw firm conclusions about
such a baseline.  Alternatively, however, there are solid data on the trends in
hate crimes law enforcement (rather than in hate crimes occurrence). Those
trends show virtually identical percentages of hate crimes prosecutions brought
against African Americans as the total percentage of prosecutions of African
Americans for all crimes.  These data suggest that hate crimes legislation at
least does not worsen the racial disparities problem.  Furthermore, a recent,
intensive participant-observer study of the pseudonymous Central City Bias
Task Force revealed an “over-representation of African Americans and Latinos
as victims, and a slight under-representation of those groups as perpetrators.”23
19. See id. at 44.
20. See Frederick M. Lawrence, Enforcing Bias-Crimes Laws Without Bias: Evaluating the Dispro-
portionate-Enforcement Critique, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 49, 51–55 (Summer 2003) (summarizing
the literature).
21. See id. (summarizing, and rejecting, this view).
22. See JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HATE
CRIME (2002).  Professor Bell’s book is of particular importance on this point.  She conducted a bril-
liant in-depth ethnographic study of how hate crimes laws work in practice in the police department of
a pseudonymous American city.  Bell concluded that the police in that city generally enforced bias
crimes laws in a racially non-discriminatory manner and with careful attention to avoiding infringe-
ments upon First Amendment freedoms.  Id. at 181–84.
23. See LAWRENCE, supra note 20, at 64.
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Data from Los Angeles and Chicago similarly contradict what we would expect
to find, were the disproportionate enforcement critique correct.24  To the con-
trary, the data suggest that whites are the primary targets of bias-crimes investi-
gation and prosecutions.  Accordingly, Lawrence insists, we can at least con-
clude that the critics of bias-crimes laws lack empirical data to support their
critique, and, with perhaps less confidence, we can assert that bias-crimes laws
simply are not enforced in a biased manner at all.  Alternatively, even if it is
assumed that criminal law enforcement generally is biased, then the right place
to start is to identify and correct the overall systemic biases rather than to single
out the one sort of crime that is designed precisely to attack the worst sort of
racial bias in the American population more generally.  Furthermore, says Law-
rence, the critique of bias crimes is founded on an assumption that such laws
were designed to protect particular minority groups as victims.  But the justifi-
cation for such laws is rather that all society is injured when any offender singles
out a victim because of that victim’s racial group membership regardless of to
which racial group he belongs.25  Lawrence, therefore, rests with the critics of
bias-crimes law.  That burden has not been met.
David Harris sets his sights on the profiling of racial minorities while they
are driving on America’s highways and walking on America’s streets.  In The
Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of Data Collec-
tion, Harris responds to the defenders of racial profiling.26  Those who defend
profiling rely on one of two related arguments.  First, profiling works, that is,
the police catch more wrongdoers with it than without it.  Second, profiling is
just good common sense because racial minorities really do commit crimes at a
higher rate than do whites.  Moreover, because non-whites are also victimized
at a higher rate, profiling is necessary to offer equal protection from crime to
the many law-abiding members of minority communities.27
Concerning the first point, Harris maintains that if we select the right meas-
ure, profiling defenders are simply wrong.  Profiling is less effective at catching
bad guys than are alternative law enforcement techniques.  The correct measure
is the “hit rate” (rather than the rates of arrest or incarceration).  A “hit rate” is
“the rate at which police actually find criminals, uncover guns, and confiscate
drugs when they perform stops and searches.”28  The data shows that hit rates
are higher for whites than for blacks and Latinos.  The police get a hit less often
24. See id.  at 64–65 (summarizing the Los Angeles and Chicago data).
25. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crimes
Legislation Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739 (1999) (arguing that hate crimes laws promote individual-
ized justice while protecting individual and group identity—regardless of skin color—and a broader
American political culture that embraces equal respect for all and an anti-racist citizen character).
26. See David A. Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of
Data Collection,  66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71 (Summer 2003).
27. See generally MAC DONALD, supra note 3.
28. See Harris, supra note 26, at 81.
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when relying on race as a factor than when relying solely on behavioral indica-
tors of crime.
Harris is also wary about accepting the claim that racial minorities commit
more crimes than whites.  First, he explains, the relevant comparison population
must not be all minorities but rather, for example, all minorities on the road.
What percentages of minority drivers commit crime relative to white drivers?
Some profiling defenders, such as Heather Mac Donald, are fond of citing a
New Jersey study finding that minority drivers in that state speed at a higher
rate than do whites.29  Harris challenges the methodology of the study but
argues that, even if the methodology is assumed to be sound, the study is irrele-
vant.  There are many more types of traffic offenses than speeding; almost eve-
ryone routinely commits some sort of traffic offense, so offending rates do not
explain stop rates, and speeding is indeed the reason for only a small percentage
of traffic stops.  More importantly, speeding may justify a stop but not a frisk or
a full automobile search.  Nor can speeding explain from whom the police seek
to conduct consent searches of those stopped.  Indeed, the data suggest a clear
racial pattern in whom officers target for “consent” searches.30  The crime rate
for speeding neither explains nor justifies this difference.  Additionally, the
qualitative evidence—admissions by police officers themselves—supports racial
stereotyping rather than sound race-related empirical judgments as the explana-
tion for relative search rates of whites and racial minorities.  Harris goes into far
more detail on the specifics of what properly done data collection teaches about
profiling than I can capture in this brief summary.  But his bottom line is clear:
Racial profiling is neither empirically justified nor effective.  Indeed, it is so
ineffective in catching the real bad guys as to endanger public safety.
Bernard Harcourt continues this Symposium’s survey of the local geography
of race data.  In his piece, From the Ne’er-Do-Well to the Criminal History Cate-
gory: The Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, Harcourt views
racial disparities as, in part, a consequence of a broader development in crimi-
nal justice thinking: the ever-increasing trend in the twentieth century away
from individualized to probabilistic assessment of actual and potential offend-
ers.31  Harcourt challenges the accuracy of the picture painted by many criminal
justice scholars of an early twentieth century “clinical model” that sought to
understand and treat each offender as a unique person.  Harcourt finds implicit
in the clinical model the same sort of actuarial or probabilistic thinking that
appears in the later twentieth century, in the form of sentencing guidelines.  The
central identifying feature of probabilistic thinking is that it treats offenders or
suspects as members of a group rather than as special individuals.  Thus, for
29. See MAC DONALD, supra note 3, at 31–34.
30. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ & MARGARET L. PARIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
312–49, 381–92 (1997 & Supp. 2002) (presenting a summary on the constitutional law of stops, frisks,
automobile searches, and consent searches).
31. See Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne’er-Do-Well to the Criminal History Category: The
Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS  99 (Summer 2003).
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example, all offenders with three prior robbery convictions who are sentenced
on a new robbery are considered to pose a similar risk of recidivism and to
share a similarly evil character sufficient to merit similar sentences.  Such an
assessment may therefore ignore, or at least give little weight to, this particular
offender’s motivation for committing the robbery—such as his need to raise
money to aid his seriously ill mother, or may dismiss his long record of charita-
ble service to his community as irrelevant.  He is judged primarily, even if not
entirely, on the likely feelings and behavior of others in his group—a group with
no independent identity other than that given to them by the law, a group that
is literally created by the sentencing guidelines.
That the guidelines allow some room for judicial discretion and considera-
tion of individual context does not alter Harcourt’s thesis.  All human reasoning
embraces both a focus on what is unique and what is statistically probable.
Individualized justice and group-based justice are less dichotomous than they
are points on a spectrum.32  Actuarial reasoning moves far closer to group-think,
however, than to its more individualized alternatives.  Indeed, actuarial sen-
tencing theorists recognize that not all members of a group will behave as the
group stereotype predicts.  Nevertheless, all group members are treated as if
they fit within the group stereotype.
Harcourt sees the sentencing guidelines as but one example of group-think,
finding its presence at various stages of the criminal process throughout the
twentieth century.  Other examples include group-think during the investiga-
tory stages of the process when the state is dealing with mere suspects rather
than convicts.  Among Harcourt’s examples of investigatory group-think are the
drug-courier profile and the school-shooter threat assessment.  But, Harcourt
concludes, the actuarial model’s growing influence on the investigatory phases
can worsen racial disparities in law enforcement even if members of a particular
race do indeed commit certain crimes at a higher rate than those of other races.33  I
will not steal Harcourt’s thunder here by rehearsing his careful explanation, via
a series of hypothetical (but realistic) mathematical examples of why this is so.
Suffice it to say that he convincingly demonstrates that devoting ever-more
resources to targeting law enforcement based on even accurate understandings
of offending rates by racial groups will, over time, lead to increasing percent-
ages of such groups being incarcerated when there is no corresponding increase
in the rate at which the group actually offends.  The problem is, of course, much
worse if, as David Harris argues,34 the provable offending rates for the targeted
32. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character
Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1 (1993).
33. For an analogous, though not identical, argument on this point, see FRANK WU, YELLOW:
RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 190–213 (2002).  One author has recently argued that
the American reticence to individualized justice has another, perhaps unexpected, consequence: push-
ing Americans toward harsher penalties than prevail in states more concerned with individual differ-
ences.  See generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).
34. See Harris, supra note 26, at 141.
FOREWORD2.DOC 06/26/03  2:27 PM
10 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:1
racial group are far lower than is the police’s perception of those rates.  Har-
court recognizes that there could be confounding factors at work whose effects
are invisible because we currently lack sufficient empirical evidence of their
presence.  Nevertheless, he cautions that there are strong reasons to believe
that his thesis is correct: Police officers relying on race in the good faith belief
that that is the most efficient and effective way to reduce crime will unwittingly
worsen racial disparities far beyond what any empirical analysis would justify.
Although other authors have noted that profiling can make assumed racial
offending rate differences into an apparently self-fulfilling prophecy,35 none has
done so with Harcourt’s mathematical clarity.  More importantly, Harcourt
explains how profiling’s self-fulfilling nature can stem from a broader social
phenomenon—actuarial thinking—that may create similar problems at many
decision points in the justice process, and starkly highlights how statistical
thinking can change the very world that we measure.
More research, Harcourt recognizes, is needed to confirm or refute his sugges-
tion that actuarial thinking is itself one important cause of current racial dispari-
ties in the criminal justice system.  Whether it is or not, however, his resounding
caution that unthinkingly acting on even valid empirical data can unfairly
worsen such disparities is one that he passionately exhorts policymakers to
remember.
Joseph Kennedy, like Bernard Harcourt, turns in part to history as a way of
understanding our current situation.  Kennedy’s concern, however, is not with
how the criminal law is enforced, but rather with its substance.  His focus is on
the consequences of the War on Drugs.  In Drug Wars in Black and White,
Kennedy compares two drug wars—Prohibition, the war on whites, and the cur-
rent drug war on African Americans.36  That comparison turns on Kennedy’s
distinction between “vice” crimes and “real” crimes.  “Vice” crimes are
designed to contain a behavior that, when too widespread,  can have ill social
consequences.  “Real” crimes target persons and behaviors that are evil and
must, therefore, be obliterated.  Society invests far more resources in the effort
to obliterate than the effort to contain.  Obliteration efforts can, therefore, have
a much greater impact on affected communities.37
Prohibition, argues Kennedy, was an era in which alcohol use was con-
demned more as vice than as evil.  Narcotic drug use was similarly placed in the
vice category in the early twentieth century.  Prohibition did lead to an explo-
35. See, e.g., WU, supra note 33, at 190–213.
36. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Drug Wars in Black and White, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153
(Summer 2003).
37. On the current drug war as an effort to obliterate entire communities, see generally MILLER,
supra note 10, comparing the tactics used in the current assault on addicts to the measures used to con-
tain, then decimate, Jewish communities in the early to middle years of Nazi Germany.  For analyses of
“vice” and histories of drug regulation, see generally RICHARD DAVENPORT-HINES, THE PURSUIT OF
OBLIVION: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF NARCOTICS 1500–2000 (2001); ROBERT J. MACOUN & PETER
REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES, AND PLACES (2001).
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sion of federal prosecutions for alcohol-related offenses.  But, as Kennedy
demonstrates, the punishments imposed for these offenses were “typically quite
low.”38  Admittedly, the nation’s overall attitude toward criminal punishment
was likely far less punitive than it is today.  It was also a time, however, when
the proportion of whites incarcerated overall relative to blacks was much higher
than it is today.  That emphasis on prosecution of whites was true for liquor
offenses as well.  Furthermore, liquor use was not viewed as itself “crimino-
genic” in the way that crack use is viewed today.  Rephrased, alcohol use was
not generally understood to drive the users toward robberies and burglaries to
support their “habit.”  Yet the opposite is true of the public’s current under-
standing of the ill social effects of crack cocaine dependency.  Additionally, and
perhaps most importantly, the sentences imposed for Prohibition-era liquor
offenses were significantly shorter than the sentences for violent or frightening
theft crimes, such as robbery and burglary.
By contrast, maintains Kennedy, today’s overall sentences are far more
harsh than was true during Prohibition, but current sentences for narcotics or
hallucinogen use are nevertheless far more punitive than is true for many other
categories of current crimes.  Correspondingly, the percentage of African
Americans involved in America’s modern criminal justice system, and espe-
cially those suspected of drug abuse offenses, has risen dramatically.  Even
drunk driving is today still viewed more as a serious vice than as a “real” crime.
Yet drug-users are portrayed as dangerous deviants, the source of myriad social
ills, from violent crime, to a collapsing urban educational system, to poverty.
Today’s drug users are portrayed as vampires, hell-spawn bent on sucking life’s
blood from the body politic.  To Kennedy, the modern embrace of hard drug
abusers as evil slime who merit, and do receive, harsh penalties seems closely
correlated to the enormous rise in the percentage ensnarement of African
Americans in today’s War on Drugs.  The correlation seems all the more worri-
some given the apparently close connection during Prohibition between low
punishment and high white involvement in the system.  Kennedy recognizes
that the correlation does not “prove” causation, but it does raise suspicions suf-
ficient to justify further research.  Kennedy does not favor the legalization of
hard drug use.  But he does hint at its de-criminalization, and at least argues for
its re-characterization as “vice” rather than “real” crime.  Given the lessons of
history, he believes, the burden of justifying a contrary policy—a burden so far
unmet—must be placed squarely on the drug warriors.
38. See Kennedy, supra note 36, at 164.
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III
THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF RACE DATA
The remaining two pieces in this Symposium—mine and Erik Luna’s—focus
on where to place race data collection on the map of current and potential
political institutions.
Luna recognizes the importance of data to guide action.  He is, however,
more interested in minorities’ perception of racial injustice at the hands of the
police than its reality.  These mere perceptions, whether accurate or not, he
argues in Race, Crime, and Institutional Design, have numerous ill conse-
quences, including citizen reluctance to aid the police in combating crime,
increased criminality in certain neighborhoods as law loses its legitimacy, a
neighborhood culture that lionizes certain criminals as anti-heroes, police
under-enforcement of the law to avoid contact with indignant citizens, and mass
civil disobedience and violence between minority citizens and the law.39  Data
collection and revelation can play a part in improving police-community rela-
tions because transparency and accountability breed trust.  But data-focused
efforts must be understood as but one piece of a broader effort to rebuild
police–community trust.  Therefore, Luna argues, the sources of current distrust
must be identified and internal police institutions redesigned to address the
causes of mutual suspicion.
Luna surveys the literature on minority community distrust of the police to
craft a laundry list of the causes of distrust, including: (1) minority over-repre-
sentation at every stage of the criminal process, (2) systemic under-enforcement
of the criminal laws in minority neighborhoods, (3) police brutality and abuse of
force, and (4) harassment by the police, such as by racial profiling or by
degrading actions like strip searches, never apologizing to the innocent, and
unnecessary destruction of personal property.  Luna also catalogues a list of the
reasons for such troubling police behavior, specifically: insular management,
poor recruitment and training, racial prejudice, isolation from the community, a
warrior mentality, poor supervision of street officers, an obsession with quanti-
tative evaluation, and a secretive police culture.  The mirror image of these rea-
sons, argues Luna, therefore offers a multi-pronged solution to the problem.
Thus among Luna’s suggested changes are modernized management empha-
sizing “client” (namely, citizen) teamwork and feedback; collaborative decision-
making (such as using civilian advisory boards); improved recruitment;
enhanced training; better discipline and oversight; and replacing quantitative
performance measures with qualitative ones, such as doing-justice and empa-
thy-creation, as hallmarks of a job well done.  He finds support for his belief
that these efforts will increase the citizenry’s trust in the police in psychological
research on procedural justice, the teachings of behavioral law and economics,
39. Erik Luna, Race, Crime, and Institutional Design, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183, 187
(Summer 2003) [hereinafter Luna, Institutional Design].
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and his own concept of “transparent policing.”40 This last concept “essentially
contends that affected community members should be able to observe and scru-
tinize the judgments of law enforcement, as well as their underlying rationales,
and to have a say in the formation and reformulation of these decisions.”41
Effective public scrutiny is thus essential to a comprehensive strategy for
building the mutual trust required by a sound theory of policing.
My own piece, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the
Power to Inspire Political Action, seeks to build an alternative strategy for
achieving precisely the sort of transparency of which Luna writes.42  My focus is
primarily on non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) like Amnesty Interna-
tional, Human Rights Watch, and the American Civil Liberties Union, and on
independent governmental organizations such as the United States Commission
on Civil Rights.  Each of these organizations, I argue, combines institutional
independence with data collection and dissemination—the data being in the
form of both numbers and narratives—to regulate the police.  This regulation is
done in ways that are analogous to how financial and operations auditors regu-
late corporations.  Whereas traditional auditors use information to improve the
power of economic markets, independent citizen police auditors use data to
improve the functioning of political markets.  This difference is as important,
however, as the similarities between NGO-style and traditional auditors.  Politi-
cal auditors act as specialized mechanisms for giving the citizenry an oversight
role, another check on governmental abuses.43  But political auditors also play a
critical role in energizing an otherwise compliant citizenry.
To illustrate this auditing function at work, I explore three case studies: (1)
the American Civil Liberties Union’s combination of traditional lawsuits with
creative data-gathering efforts, particularly in battling racial profiling and in
addressing community distrust of the police in the wake of recent racial vio-
lence in Cincinnati; (2) the use by Amnesty International of expose-like reports
and media-intensive “country campaigns” against police brutality; and (3) the
revelation by the United States Commission on Civil Rights of widespread sus-
picionless stops and frisks of racial minorities by the Street Crimes Unit of the
New York City Police Department.  These case studies reveal the respective
strengths and weaknesses of the various scrutinizing strategies.  The case studies
also illustrate two insights.  First, how data are collected and disseminated can
be politically as important as what the data reveal.  For example, in Cincinnati,
a collaborative process was used to collect data from all the stakeholder groups,
including racial minorities and the police, concerning each group’s attitudes,
40. See Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000).
41. See Luna, Institutional Design, supra note 39, at 200.
42. See Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 17.
43. Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More!: The Implications of the Informed Citizen Ideal for Dis-
covery Before Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV 709 (1999) (arguing that
the post-Reconstruction Fourth Amendment embraces a role for an activist, informed citizenry in
policing the police).
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experiences, and goals for the future.  Additionally, each stakeholder group was
involved in later ongoing processes for monitoring data on, and correcting,
future police performance.  This collaborative model of data collection and dis-
semination seems to have done much to improve police-community trust.
Second, race played a role in each of these case studies in mobilizing the
citizenry.  That observation leads me to explore the empirical data concerning
the political emotions—the kinds of emotions that inspire political action.  Most
political behavior is habitual.  Thus Democrats usually vote Democratic, and
Republicans Republican, though the voters may be quite ignorant of many of
the details of the candidates’ character and positions.  But citizens’ degree of
enthusiasm for a candidate or issue affects the strength with which a habit is
followed or whether it is followed at all.  Thus citizens unexcited about a par-
ticular candidate may simply not go to the polls.  Research reveals that African
Americans often have an unusually strong sense of group loyalty and solidar-
ity.44  Therefore, they are likely to be strongly politically motivated when they
perceive a threat to the safety of the group, an assault on the race as a whole.
An emphasis on racial disparities in policing is thus an effective strategy to
motivate African Americans, the group most affected by police behaviors and
most in need of police protection, to agitate for change.45
The long-term success of change requires, however, support from multi-
racial coalitions and from the white majority.  Previous cycles of reform after
dramatic revelations of police abuse, followed quickly by abandonment of those
reforms or even reaction against them, have demonstrated the importance of
this observation.  Yet whites frequently come to understand, at least at a sub-
conscious level, black criminality as the real problem and the cause of a need
for aggressive policing.  Precisely because political attitudes and behavior are
habitual and resistant to change, whites, no matter how well-meaning, are
unlikely allies.  But, empirical studies show, vivid and novel information can
generate political anxiety, and such anxiety renders political actors ripe for
change.  The vivid personal narratives and powerful statistical picture painted
by racial auditors can generate precisely the necessary anxiety among at least a
significant portion of the white population.  That anxiety must be generated,
however, by appeal to the white sense of political honor—the need to live a life
consistent with one’s principled code about how to live a good life.  Many
whites share a principled commitment to racial equality as central to our consti-
tutional order.  When confronted vividly with the inconsistency between princi-
pled aspirations and less-principled realities, many whites can come to see
police reform as a battle for the common good at the heart of the republic.  Just
as many whites were over time moved to change their hearts, minds, and actions
44. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 85–91 (2002).
45. Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 17, at 265.
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by the civil rights movement,46 so can the persistent revelations of truth by racial
auditors prod whites to join the quest for combining fair policing with safer
streets.
The police, like any large human organization, learn to follow a local honor
code governing their behavior within the organization.  But, studies also show,
when localized codes are exposed to the light of day, broader social honor codes
reassert themselves within the organization.  Constant sunshine can therefore
restore errant officers to honorable behavior as judged by broader American
political honor codes that embrace equality and respect for others.  Accord-
ingly, my piece concludes with ruminations about ways that “racial auditors”
can improve their strategies while institutional police department reforms can
bring auditors closer to needed information without sacrificing independence.
In this way, auditors better recognize that “today, liberty’s life depends on an
engaged, activist citizenry goading America to live up to the best of its princi-
ples and dreams.”47
IV
CONCLUSION
Diverse views are offered by the various participants in this Symposium.
Taken as a whole, the Symposium authors support neither the stereotyped
views of the political right nor those of the political left; there is indeed much
said here to please and to anger persons holding views at both extremes.  What
I hope that this Symposium accomplishes, however, is the sensitizing of readers
to the importance of holding data-informed views.  Equally importantly, I hope
that readers will see much concrete evidence here that the mere decision to rely
on data, the choices made about how to collect and disseminate it, and the can-
dor with which decision-makers acknowledge its strengths and weaknesses each
has important political implications.  Each such choice profoundly affects both
the distribution of power among societal groups and the degree of trust
between the state and its citizens.  Achieving such trust is ultimately the beating
heart of a healthy republic.
46. Cf. DONALD T. PHILLIPS, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. ON LEADERSHIP: INSPIRATION &
WISDOM FOR CHALLENGING TIMES 52–67 (1999) (explaining how Martin Luther King’s strategy for
social change in the mid-twentieth-century Civil Rights Movement was carefully calculated to change
white hearts and minds); HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1492–
PRESENT 452 (1999) (“King’s stress on love and nonviolence was powerfully effective in building a
sympathetic following throughout the nation, among whites as well as blacks.”).
47. See Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 17, at 297.
